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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of stochastic MIMO wireless networks over small-scale α-µ fad-
ing channels, where both the legitimate receivers and eavesdrop-
pers are distributed with two independent homogeneous Poisson
point processes (HPPPs). Specifically, accounting for the presence
of non-colluding eavesdroppers, secrecy performance metrics, in-
cluding the connection outage probability (COP), the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ) and ergodic secrecy capacity,
are derived regarding the k-th nearest/best user cases. The index
for the k-th nearest user is extracted from the ordering, in terms
of the distances between transmitters and receivers, whereas that
for the k-th best user is based on the combined effects of path-
loss and small-scale fading. In particular, the probability density
functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs)
of the composite channel gain, for the k-th nearest and best
user, are characterized, respectively. Benefiting from these results,
closed-form representations of the COP, PNZ and ergodic secrecy
capacity are subsequently obtained. Furthermore, a limit on the
maximal number of the best-ordered users is also computed, for
a given secrecy outage constraint. Finally, numerical results are
provided to verify the correctness of our derivations. Additionally,
the effects of fading parameters, path-loss exponent, and density
ratios are also analyzed.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Poisson point process,
α-µ fading, random MIMO wireless networks, k-th legitimate
user.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE security issue impacting the wireless networks hasrecently attracted significant attention from the academic
and industrial communities. In this vein, the development of
conventional approaches, based on cryptography techniques,
faces new challenges, especially in large-scale wireless net-
work, due to its high power consumption and complexity
requirements. Alternatively, physical layer security (PLS) ap-
pears as an appealing strategy to address such a concern
by conversely exploiting the inherent randomness and noisy
characteristics of radio channels in order to protect confidential
messages from being wiretapped.
A. Background and Related Works
The fundamental of the PLS was initially built on the dis-
covery of ‘perfect secrecy’ by Shannon [1] and the conceptual
finding of degraded ‘wiretap channel’, for the discrete memo-
ryless channel, by Wyner [2]. Later on, successive efforts were
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devoted to the generalization of the results in [2] to additive
Gaussian noise channels [3], broadcast channels [4], fad-
ing channels [5]–[10], multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
communications [11]–[13], cooperative networks [14], cellular
networks [15], [16] among other topics.
A common shortage of the aforesaid works [3]–[10], [13],
[14], based on the point-to-point communication links, lies in
the uncertainty of users’ spatial locations. Strictly speaking,
users’ spatial locations undoubtedly play a crucial role when
investigating the large scale fading in random networks. The
pioneer works, led by Haenggi [17], [18], and where users
distributed randomly based on stochastic geometry, was mod-
eled as the Poisson point process (PPP). Specifically, it is
worthy to mention that the concept of ‘secrecy graph’ was
firstly proposed to study the secrecy connectivity metric, and
subsequently the maximum secrecy rate [19] when colluding
eavesdroppers are considered.
More recently, in [20]–[24], the authors considered the
two-dimensional random wireless network under Rayleigh,
composite fading and Nakagami-m fading channels, where
both the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are drawn
from two independent homogeneous PPPs (HPPPs). Authors
in [20] studied the secure MIMO transmission subjected to
Rayleigh fading. Zheng et al. in [22] analyzed the transmission
secrecy outage probability for multiple-input and single-output
(MISO) systems, and proposed the concept of ‘security region
(SR)’, which is a geometry region, defined as the legitimate re-
ceiver’s locations having a certain guaranteed level of secrecy.
Differently, Satyanarayana et al. proposed another SR 1 [25],
[26], which is defined as the region where the set of ordered
nodes can safely communicate with typical destination, for a
given secrecy outage constraint.
Motivated by those references, it is thus of tremendous
significance to study how many legitimate users are located
within the coverage of the transmitter (i.e., base station), in
the presence of unknown number of eavesdroppers. Most of
the existing work can be summarized in terms of the ordering
policy, namely the k-th legitimate user, either based on the
distances between transmitters and users, or the instantaneous
received composite channel gain. Moving in this direction, it is
reported that limited studies are seen on the secrecy assessment
of the k-th legitimate receiver. Specifically, the result disclosed
in [21] is merely restricted to the mathematical treatment of
the secrecy outage probability of the k-th nearest receiver
(i.e., the index is from the ordering based on the distance
between the source and the destination). In contrast, the results
1Within the security region, all users can achieve high secrecy gains.
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2unveiled in [23]–[26] are constrained to the k-th best receiver2
(i.e., the index is according to the array of the composite
channel gains). It is reported that [27] investigated the secrecy
issue over Rayleigh fading channels, while considering both
ordering policies without offering any SR. On the other hand,
the introduced k-th nearest or best receiver is applicable to
vehicular networks. The k-th best user can be considered as
any potential vehicle receiving the k-th maximum path gain
from a source vehicle. One can construct the security region by
selecting all the best nodes instead of random users. Selecting
the best users to coordinate among each other can further
improve the security of the network.
Outstandingly, the aforesaid studies merely focus on the
secrecy analysis, influenced by the colluding/non-colluding
eavesdroppers but have not taken the more general fading
model, namely, α-µ fading channel, into consideration. The
α-µ distribution was first proposed by Yacoub in [28] to
model the small scale variation of fading signal under line-of-
sight conditions [29], [30]. It is physically described with two
key fading parameters, i.e., non-linearity of the propagation
medium α and the clustering of the multipath waves µ. The
advantage of these two factors is regarded as a useful tool to
vividly depict the inhomogeneous surroundings compared with
other existing fading models, such as Rayleigh, Nakagami-
m. Most of them are based on the unrealistic assumption
of homogeneous (scattering) environment. Fortunately, the α-
µ fading model was later on found valid and feasible in
many realistic situations [31]–[37], including the vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communication networks and wireless body
area networks (WBAN). In addition, the α-µ distribution is
flexible and mathematical tractable, since it can be extended
to Rayleigh, Nakagami-m and Weibull fading by simply at-
tributing the fading parameters α and µ to selected values.
For example, choosing α = 2 and µ = 1 will reduce it to
Rayleigh fading, while choosing α = 2 and µ = m will make
it correspond to Nakagami-m fading.
To the best knowledge of the authors, in [7], [8], [10], the
authors derived the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
and secrecy outage probability of point-to-point communi-
cation over α-µ fading channels. Lei et al. [9] later on
studied the average secrecy capacity of α-µ wiretap fading
channels. The importance of evaluating the aforementioned
two metrics is based on the behavior of the eavesdroppers. If
they are active, meaning that it is possible to have their channel
state information (CSI) at the transmitter, the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability
are crucial. If they are passive, average secrecy capacity is
therefore a key benchmark. With respect to the random single-
input and single-output (SISO) wireless networks, the authors
in [25], [26] and [38] correspondingly investigated the secrecy
outage probability and the ergodic secrecy capacity in terms
of the k-th best user, respectively. Apart from the literature
[7]–[10], [25], [26], [38]–[40], efforts to explore the secrecy
evaluation of random MIMO wireless networks over α-µ
fading channels are rarely witnessed.
2It is worth mentioning that the k-th best user is the one with the k-th
maximal received signal out of K users.
B. Contribution and Organization
Consequently, the essence of this paper is the exploration of
the k-th legitimate user’s secrecy performance over α-µ fading
channel in typical random wireless networks.
In this paper, we consider a stochastic MIMO wireless
system, in the presence of two types of receivers, namely,
legitimate users and eavesdroppers. They are assumed to be
distributed with two independent HPPPs. The conventional
space-time transmission (STT) is considered [12]. All re-
ceivers have access to perfect channel state information (CSI),
which are all subjected to quasi-static α-µ fading. Since Wyner
had concluded that perfect secrecy can be assured only if
legitimate links have higher transmission rate, compared to
wiretap links, the pursuit of outage-based secrecy performance
analysis is considered reasonable and feasible when a fixed
data transmission scheme is adopted for such quasi-static
fading channels, as indicated in [24], [41]. In [38], the secure
connection probability of the k-th legitimate receiver to the
transmitter was studied, as well as the ergodic secrecy capacity.
To this end, the connection outage probability (COP), the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ) and the er-
godic secrecy capacity, in terms of the k-th nearest and best
legitimate receivers, are taken into consideration.
Since the concept of the k-th best user can be regarded as a
security region, it is crucial to identify the k∗ best users out of
K users that can communicate securely with the transmitter
in such region. In this work, we identify a zone (i.e., a limited
number of legitimate users) comprising of such ordered k∗
best users, for a given secrecy constraint.
The contributions of this paper are multifold, which can be
pointed out as:
• The probability of density functions (PDFs) and cu-
mulative distribution function (CDFs) of the composite
channel gain for the k-th nearest and best user are
derived, respectively. This is essentially important for
formulating the secrecy metrics, including the connection
outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity and ergodic secrecy capacity.
• Unlike the model studied in [9], which considered the
point-to-point system and a single eavesdropper, we study
the secrecy capacity of random networks with multiple
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. The exact closed
form expressions of the COP, PNZ and ergodic secrecy
capacity of the k-th legitimate user are derived.
• Motivated by the PNZ of the k-th best receiver, a limit
on the maximal number of the best-ordered receivers is
calculated thereafter respecting a given secrecy outage
probability. In other words, this limit eventually provides
a security region concept, henceforth, all the system
parameters are looked upon, based on this concept, giving
a better insight into the secrecy capacity regions of
random wireless networks.
• The accuracy of our derivations are successfully validated
by Monte-Carlo simulation. Numerical outcomes are pre-
sented to indicate the effect of the path-loss exponent,
densities of the users and fading parameters.
3TABLE I: Notations and symbols
Notations Description
[x]+ [x]+ = max(x, 0)
N positive integer
E expectation operator
i.i.d identical independent distributed
Rt transmission rate
d dimensions of the network
r distance from the origin to the receiver
υ path-loss exponent
fX PDF of X
FX CDF of X
cd pi
d/2/Γ(1 + d/2)
δ d/υ
Ψ path-loss process before fading
Ξk path-loss process with fading for legitimate users
Ξe path-loss process with fading for eavesdroppers
λb density for legitimate receivers
λe density for eavesdroppers
Γ(a)
Γ(a) =
∫∞
0 t
a−1e−tdt
Gamma function [42, eq. (8.310.1)]
γ(a, x)
γ(a, x) =
∫ x
0 t
a−1e−tdt
lower incomplete gamma function [42, eq. (8.350.1)]
Γ(a, x)
Γ(a, x) =
∫∞
x t
a−1e−tdt
upper incomplete gamma function [42, eq. (8.350.2)]
Hp,qm,n[·] Fox’s H-function [43, eq. (1.1.1)]
The insights obtained from the outcomes of this paper, regard-
ing the crucial parameters of the secrecy performance, inspire
researchers and vehicle wireless communication engineers to
quickly evaluate system performance and optimize available
parameters when confronting various security risks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: system model
and problem formulation are depicted in Sections II and III,
respectively. The COP, PNZ and the ergodic secrecy capacity
are derived in Section IV. Numerical results and discussions
are then presented in Section V and followed by Section VI
with concluding remarks. Notations and symbols used in this
paper are shown in Table. I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, a random wireless network, displayed in
Fig. 1 in an unbound Euclidean space of dimension d is
under consideration. The typical transmitter is located at the
origin, who has Na (Na ≥ 1) antennas, and two types of
receivers, namely the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
with Nb (Nb ≥ 1), Ne (Ne ≥ 1) antennas, respectively. The
locations of these receivers are drawn from two independent
HPPPs. Their location sets are separately denoted by Φb(λb)
and Φe(λe) with corresponding densities λb and λe [20],
[23]. In such a network configuration, it is assumed that the
communication links undergo a path-loss characterized by the
exponent υ and α-µ fading.
Consider a transmitter that intends to send private messages
to a legitimate user in the presence of eavesdroppers located
at some unknown distances re. In such a stochastic MIMO
Alice Bob
Eavesdroppers
re
rl
Legitimate user
Transmitter
Eavesdropper
Fig. 1: A 2-dimensional stochastic MIMO wireless network with
independently HPPP distributed legitimate receivers and eavesdrop-
pers.
wireless system, the conventional STT scheme is considered
at the transmitter and receivers [12], then the instantaneous
received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at a legitimate user, γb,
and an eavesdropper, γe, would be expressed as [12, eq.(1)]
γb =
P
Na∑
na=1
Nb∑
nk=1
gna,nk
rυl σ
2
k
= ηk
gk
rυl
, (1a)
γe =
P
Na∑
na=1
Ne∑
ne=1
gna,ne
rυeσ
2
e
= ηe
ge
rυe
, (1b)
where ηi = Pσ2i , gna,ni = |hna,ni |
2, i ∈ {k, e}, denote
the instantaneous channel power gain with unit mean. P
denotes the transmission power and the terms σi denote the
noise power at the legitimate and eavesdropping receivers,
respectively. So herein, rl and hna,nk are the distance and
fading envelope from the transmitter to the k-th legitimate
receiver, respectively. Similarly, re and hna,ne are the distance
and fading envelope from the transmitter to the eavesdropper,
respectively. Here, hna,ni are modeled by α-µ fading with an
arbitrary fading parameter αi > 0 and an inverse normalized
variance of hαii denoted as µi.
Since STT scheme is used, gi is obviously the sum of all
the receivers’ channel gain. Recalling the results obtained in
[44], the exact PDF and CDF of gi are too complex due to
the convolution of M PDFs of each eavesdropper’s channel
gain when developing the secrecy performance. Thanks to
the highly tight approximation method provided therein, it is
deduced therein that the PDF of gi is given as the following
form with parameters (αi, µi, Ωi)3,
fgi(x) ≈
αix
αiµi
2 −1
2Ω
αiµi
2
i Γ (µi)
exp
(
−
(
x
Ωi
)αi
2
)
= iH
1,0
0,1
[
θix
∣∣∣∣ −(µi − 2αi , 2αi )
]
,
(2)
3The method of obtaining all these three parameters is suggested to refer
to [44].
4where Ωi =
Γ(µi)
Γ
(
µi+
2
αi
) , i = 1ΩiΓ(µi) , and θi = 1Ωi . After
integrating (2), the CDF of gi is given by
Fgi(x) =
γ
(
µi,
(
x
Ωi
)αi
2
)
Γ (µi)
= 1− i
θi
H2,01,2
[
θix
∣∣∣∣ (1, 1)(0, 1), (µi, 2αi )
]
.
(3)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. User Association
1) The nearest user: In this case, all the receivers are
ordered according to their distance from the transmitter. Let
{rk} be a random set of legitimate receivers in ascending
order of the distances from the receiver to the transmitter (i.e.,
|r1| < |r2| < |r3| < · · · ). Letting Z = gkrυk , the PDF and CDF
of the composite channel gain are respectively given in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The PDF and CDF of the composite channel gain
for the k-th nearest legitimate user are given by (4a) and (4b)
in terms of the Fox’s H-function4, respectively.
f gk
rυ
k
(z) =
k
A
1
δ
k Γ(k)
H1,11,1
[
θkz
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣ (1− k − 1δ , 1δ )(µk − 2αk , 2αk )
]
, (4a)
F gk
rυ
k
(z) = 1− k
θkΓ(k)
H2,12,2
[
θkz
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣ (1− k, 1δ ), (1, 1)(0, 1), (µk, 2αk )
]
, (4b)
where Ak = piλb.
Proof. See Appendix A and B, respectively. 
Similarly, the PDF and CDF for the k-th nearest eavesdrop-
per can be obtained with parameters Ae = piλe.
2) The best user: Unlike the nearest user, the k-th best
user describes the ordering of the recerivers according to the
received SNR function of the combination of the path-loss and
small-scale fading. Letting Ξk = {ξk , rυk/gk, k ∈ N} be the
path-loss process with small-scale fading. It is reported in [17]
that Ξk is also a PPP with the intensity function λΞk . For the
k-th best user, we have |ξ1| < |ξ2| < |ξ3| < · · · , since ξk
takes the inverse shape of the composite channel gain.
Lemma 2. Given the path-loss process with the α-µ fading,
the intensity of Ξk is given by
λΞk = Ab0x
δ−1, (5)
where Ab0 =
λbcdδΩ
δ
kΓ
(
µk+
2δ
αk
)
Γ(µk)
.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Similarly, with regard to eavesdroppers, we have Ξe =
{rυe /ge, e ∈ N}, λΞe = Ae0yδ−1, Ae0 =
λecdδΩ
δ
eΓ(µe+ 2δαe )
Γ(µe)
.
Let 1ξk = Z, then the PDF and CDF of
1
ξk
are provided in
the following Lemma.
4The numerical evaluation of Fox’s H-function for MATLAB implemen-
tations is to use the method given in [45, Table. II].
0 5 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Simulation, k = 3
Simulation, k = 5
Analysis, eq. (4a)
Analysis, eq. (4a)
0 5 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Simulation, k = 3
Simulation, k = 5
Analysis, eq. (6a)
Analysis, eq. (6a)
Fig. 2: The PDFs for the k-th best and nearest users when αk = 2,
µk = 3, ηk = 0 dB, d = υ = 2, λb = 2, Na = Nb = 1.
Lemma 3. The PDF and CDF of the composite channel gain
for the k-th best user are
f 1
ξk
(z) = exp
(−Ab1z−δ) δ(Ab1z−δ)k
z−1Γ(k)
. (6a)
F 1
ξk
(z) =
Γ(k,Ab1z
−δ)
Γ(k)
, (6b)
where Ab1 = Ab0/δ.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the PDFs for the k-th nearest and
the k-th best legitimate user are respectively demonstrated,
it is observed that our analysis are successfully validated by
simulation results.
B. Secrecy Metrics
1) Connection outage probability: Connection outage prob-
ability is defined as the event in which the legitimate receiver
cannot successfully decode the transmitted messages. This
happens when the main channel capacity falls below the actual
transmission rate Rt. It is mathematically defined as
Pco(Rt) = Pr
(
log2
(
1 +
ηkgk
rυl
)
< Rt
)
. (7)
2) Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity: The secrecy
capacity of the aforementioned system model under the as-
sumption that eavesdroppers do not collude, is [23]
Cs:k =
[
log2
(
1 +
ηkgk
rυl
)
− log2
(
1 +
ηege
rυe
)]+
. (8)
When the wiretap channel capacity is less than the main chan-
nel capacity, the eavesdroppers are incapable of successfully
decoding the transmitted messages. The probability of the
occurrence for this event is called as the probability of non-
zero secrecy capacity. Mathematically from (8), the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity is defined as
Pnz = Pr
(
ηkgk
rυl
>
ηege
rυe
)
. (9)
53) Ergodic secrecy capacity: In line with [11], [38], [46]–
[49], the ergodic secrecy capacity is obtained as follows
Cs:k =
E
[
log2
(
1 +
ηkgk
rυl
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RMk
−E
[
log2
(
1 +
ηege
rυe
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RWk

+
,
(10)
where RMk and R
W
k are the ergodic capacity of the transmitter
to the k-th legitimate receiver and the k-th eavesdropper,
respectively.
IV. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIZATION
By using the PDFs and CDFs of the composite channel
gain for the k-th nearest/best user, we study the COP, PNZ,
and ergodic secrecy capacity, respectively.
A. Performance Characterization of the COP
1) Connection outage probability for the k-th nearest re-
ceiver: From the definition, the COP for the k-th nearest
legitimate receiver is mathematically expressed as
Pco,N (Rt) = Pr
(
log2
(
1 +
ηkgk
rυk
)
< Rt
)
= Pr
(
gk
rυk
<
2Rt − 1
ηk
)
.
(11)
Notably, Pco,N (Rt) can be assessed from the PDF of the k-th
legitimate receiver’s channel gain. For the ease of notations,
we set ∆ = 2
Rt−1
ηk
.
Proposition 1. The COP of the k-th nearest legitimate receiver
is given as
Pco,N (Rt) = F gk
rυ
k
(∆) . (12)
Proof. Substituting (4b) into (11), the proof is achieved. 
2) Connection outage probability for the k-th best receiver:
Similarly, the COP for the k-th best receiver is given
Pco,B(Rt) = Pr
(
log2
(
1 +
ηk
ξk
)
< Rt
)
= 1− Pr
(
ξk <
1
∆
)
.
(13)
Based on (13), it is becoming apparent that the COP for the
k-th best receiver is termed as Fξk .
Proposition 2. The COP of the k-th best legitimate receiver
takes the following shape
Pco,B(Rt) =
Γ
(
k,Ab1∆
−δ)
Γ(k)
. (14)
Proof. Substituting (6b) into (13), the proof is completed. 
B. Performance Characterization of the PNZ
In this section, the PNZs, with respect to the k-th nearest
and best legitimate receiver, are well investigated.
As seen from (8) for the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the
non-zero secrecy capacity for the k-th legitimate receiver is
mathematically guaranteed with the probability given for the
following four scenarios:
• case 1): the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the pres-
ence of the 1st nearest eavesdropper5;
Pnz,NN = Pr
(
ηkgk
rυk
>
ηege
rυe
)
= Pr
(
ge
rυe
rυk
gk
<
ηk
ηe
)
=
∫ ∞
0
F ge
rυe
($y)f gk
rυ
k
(y) dy.
(15)
• case 2): the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence
of the 1st best eavesdropper6;
Pnz,BB = Pr
(
ηk
ξk
>
ηe
ξe
)
= 1− Pr
(
ξe
ξk
<
1
$
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fξe
( y
$
)
fξk(y)dy.
(16)
• case 3): the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the pres-
ence of the 1st best eavesdropper;
Pnz,NB = Pr
(
ηkgk
rυk
>
ηe
ξe
)
= 1− Pr
(
gk
rυk
ξe <
1
$
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
F gk
rυ
k
(
1
$y
)
fξe(y)dy.
(17)
• case 4): the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence
of the 1st nearest eavesdropper
Pnz,BN = Pr
(
ηk
ξk
>
ηege
rυe
)
= Pr
(
ge
rυe
ξk < $
)
=
∫ ∞
0
F ge
rυe
(
$
y
)
fξk(y)dy.
(18)
1) The k-th nearest receiver & the 1st nearest eavesdrop-
per:
Proposition 3. The PNZ of the k-th nearest legitimate re-
ceiver in the presence of the 1st nearest eavesdropper can be
calculated from
Pnz,NN = 1− ke
θkθeΓ(k)
×H3,23,3
[
θe$
θk
(
Ak
Ae
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣ (1, 1), (1− µk, 2αk ), (0, 1δ )(0, 1), (µe, 2αe ), (k, 1δ )
]
.
(19)
Proof. See Appendix E. 
5The nearest eavesdropper is the one closest to the legitimate receiver.
6The best eavesdropper is supposed to be the one with the smallest ξe.
62) The k-th best receiver & the 1st best eavesdropper:
Proposition 4. The PNZ of the k-th best legitimate receiver
in the presence of the 1st best eavesdropper is given as
Pnz,BB =
(
Ab1
Ab1 +Ae1$−δ
)k
. (20)
Proof. Motivated by (33), for the best eavesdropper, the CDF
of ξe is given by
Fξe(x) = γ
(
1, Ae1x
δ
)
= 1− exp(−Ae1xδ), (21)
where Ae1 = Ae0/δ.
After plugging (21) and (34) into (16), it yields
Pnz,BB = 1− Pr
(
ξe
ξk
<
1
$
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fξe
( y
$
)
fξk(y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Ae1
( y
$
)δ)
exp(−Ab1yδ)δ(Ab1y
δ)k
yΓ(k)
dy
(a)
=
δAkb1
Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−(Ab1 +Ae1$−δ)yδ) yδk−1dy
=
(
Ab1
Ab1 +Ae1$−δ
)k
,
(22)
where (a) follows from [42, Eq. (3.351.3)]. 
In the following lemma we characterize a limit on the k-th
best receiver. From Proposition 4, one can obtain the maximum
possible k-th index for a given probability constraint, τ =
1− Pnz,BB .
Lemma 4. The maximum number of ordered best intended
receivers that can securely communicate with the source in
the presence of the best eavesdropper is given as
k∗ = log Ab1
Ab1+Ae1$
−δ
(τ) . (23)
Proof. The proof directly follows from Proposition 4. 
3) The k-th nearest receiver & the 1st best eavesdropper:
Proposition 5. The PNZ of the k-th nearest legitimate receiver
in the presence of the 1st best non-colluding eavesdropper is
given by
Pnz,NB = k
θkΓ(k)
×H1,33,2
[
$
θk
(
Ak
Ae1
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣ (1, 1), (1− µk, 2αk ), (0, 1δ )(k, 1δ ), (0, 1)
]
.
(24)
Proof. See Appendix F. 
4) The k-th best receiver & the 1st nearest eavesdropper:
Proposition 6. The PNZ of the k-th best legitimate receiver
in the presence of the 1st nearest non-colluding eavesdropper
is given by
Pnz,BN = 1− e
θeΓ(k)
×H1,33,2
[
1
θe$
(
Ae
Ab1
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1− µe, 2αe ), (1− k, 1δ )(1, 1δ ), (0, 1)
]
.
(25)
Proof. See Appendix G. 
C. Performance Characterization of Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
From the perspective of the eavesdroppers’ received signal
quality, the first nearest or best eavesdropper can achieve the
highest composite channel gain. As such, the ergodic secrecy
capacity can be similarly analyzed for the four considered
scenarios. Motivated from (10), the ergodic secrecy capacity
can be obtained from the difference of the ergodic capaci-
ties between the transmitter-legitimate receiver link and the
transmitter-eavesdropper link [38]. In accordance with our
proposed user association method, i.e., the k-th nearest or
best user, the ergodic capacity of the transmitter to the k-th
nearest legitimate receiver, RMN,k, and the transmitter to the k-
th best legitimate receiver, RMB,k, are correspondingly obtained
in the follow proposition in order to simplify our derivations
of ergodic secrecy capacity.
Proposition 7. The ergodic capacity of the transmitter to
the k-th nearest or best legitimate user, RMN,k and R
M
B,k, are
respectively given by
RMN,k =
kH
2,3
3,3
[
ηkA
1
δ
k
θk
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1, 1), (1− µk, 2αk )(1, 1), (k, 1δ ), (0, 1)
]
θkΓ(k) ln 2
, (26a)
RMB,k =
δ
Γ(k) ln 2
H2,23,2
[
Ab1η
δ
k
∣∣∣∣ (1, δ), (1, δ))(k, 1), (1, δ), (0, δ)
]
, (26b)
where Hm,np,q [.] is the Fox’s H-function.
Proof. See Appendix. H. 
Similarly, the RWN,k and R
W
B,k can be easily derived by
making some simple manipulations. Accordingly, considering
either the 1st nearest or best eavesdropper, by letting k = 1
for RWN,k and R
W
B,k, and setting R
W
N,1 and R
W
B,1 as R
W
N and
RWB , then we have the following remark.
Remark 1. Taking account of the aforementioned four sce-
narios, the ergodic secrecy capacity are respectively given by
• case 1:
C¯s:k,NN = [R
M
N,k −RWN ]+, (27a)
• case 2:
C¯s:k,BB = [R
M
B,k −RwB ]+, (27b)
• case 3:
C¯s:k,NB = [R
M
N,k −RWB ]+, (27c)
• case 4:
C¯s:k,BN = [R
M
B,k −RWN ]+. (27d)
For the sake of showing brevity, the details are not given
in (27a-27d), respectively, however, those can be easily ob-
tained from Proposition. 7 by making some simple algebraic
substitutions.
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Fig. 3: Pco,N versus the k-th nearest legitimate receiver for ηk = 5
dB, λb = 1, Na = Nb = 1 Rt = 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
For a given network configuration, the secrecy metrics,
including the COP and PNZ, are under analysis in Section
IV. In this section, the accuracy of our analysis is validated
by presenting numerical simulations. In the whole simulation
configuration, it is assumed that r = 10 and the simulation
solely takes places under α-µ fading channels.
In addition, we will study the effects of the density, the path-
loss exponent υ, different α-µ fading factors and dimensions of
space on the secrecy metrics. Note that in our simulation, the
WAFO toolbox of MATLAB [50] has been used to generate
α-µ variates.
It is very important to note that higher system performance
is achieved at lower COP as well as higher PNZ probabilities.
A. Results pertaining to COP
This subsection studies the system performance with respect
to the nearest and best legitimate receivers, and we provide a
comparison between the two performances.
The Pco,N stated in (11) versus the k-th nearest legitimate
receiver under α-µ fading is shown in Fig. 3. It demonstrates
how the COP for the k-th nearest legitimate receiver is affected
as the legitimate user’s index increases, for various α-µ fading
scenarios. In addition, Fig. 3 also demonstrates the conformity
of our analytical derivations to simulation outcomes.
The Pco,B drafted in (13) versus λb is illustrated and
compared with the Pco,B in Fig. 4 for selected values of the k-
th legitimate nearest/best receiver. From this graph, we obtain
the conclusions that: (i) the connection outage occurs with a
higher probability for larger index values and larger λb; (ii)
since λb grows in equal steps, the gap between Pco,N and
Pco,B tends to be larger for higher index values λb.
Having studied the performance with respect to the nearest
and best legitimate receivers, we compare the COP for the 1st
nearest and best legitimate receiver for various selected path-
loss exponent υ values and Nb, in the next step. The result
of this comparison is shown in Fig. 5. Strikingly, one can
conceive that on one hand, higher path-loss exponent always
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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100
Fig. 4: Pco versus λb for selected k-th (k ∈ {2, 4}) nearest/best user
when ηk = 0 dB, Rt = 1, αk = 2, µk = 3, υ = 4, d = 2.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of Pco,N to Pco,B versus Nb for λb = 0.1,
ηk = −5 dB, αk = 2, µk = 3, Rt = 1, d = 3 and various path-loss
exponent υ ∈ {2, 4}.
results in a higher probability of connection outage both for
the k-th nearest and best receivers. On the other hand, the k-th
best receiver always owns a relatively lower connection outage
probability compared with the k-th nearest one, as predicted.
In addition, the COP deserves with lower probability due to
its better quality of received signal, as Nb increase.
B. Results pertaining to PNZ
In this subsection, we study the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity in the presence of non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers. Be reminded that higher PNZ probabilities indicate a
better system performance. For the sake of simplicity, the
first nearest/best eavesdropper is considered for evaluating the
secrecy risk. Figs. 6–12 demonstrate the PNZ versus the k-th
legitimate receiver in the presence of non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers. It is easily observed that our theoretical analyses are in
strong agreement with the simulation outcomes.
Fig. 6 plots the PNZ against the k-th nearest legitimate re-
ceiver’s index for selected values of α and µ when the nearest
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 = 2, k = e = 1
 = 2, k = 1, e = 3
 = 2, k = 3, e = 2
 = 3, k = e = 2
 = 4, k = 2, e = 3
Analysis, eq. (19)
Fig. 6: Pnz,NN versus the k-th nearest legitimate receiver for $ = 0
dB, Na = Nb = Ne = 1, αk = αe = α, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, d = 2,
υ = 2.
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Fig. 7: Pnz versus the k-th legitimate receiver for $ = 0 dB, λb =
0.2, λe = 0.1, Na = 2, Nb = 1, Ne = 2, αk = 2, µk = 1, αe = 2,
µe = 4, d = 2, υ = 2.
eavesdropper is considered. It is observed here that almost for
all values of the k-th user index, the PNZ performance is better
(probability is higher) for smaller values of α, µm and µw.
Fig. 7 compares the PNZs given in (19), (20), (24) and
(25) for the four scenarios, where the 1st nearest or best
eavesdropper is considered. One can conceive that (i) our
closed-form expressions are confirmed by the Monte-Carlo
simulation outcomes; (ii) the Pnz,BN outperforms the other
three scenarios when k = 1, 2, this trend is changing as k reach
4, the probability of having a positive secrecy capacity drops in
a descending order, namely, Pnz,NN > Pnz,NB > Pnz,BN >
Pnz,BB . The reason behind lies in that two ordering key
factors, i.e., distances and composite channel gain, are in turn
playing a critical role on the secrecy performance especially as
k increases. As shown in Fig. 8, the influence of υ on the PNZ
is demonstrated. As it can be readily observed, the PNZs tend
to decrease as the k-th user index grows for all considered υ.
Fig. 9 presents the maximum number of the k-th best users
for a given probability constraint τ . As illustrated in this figure,
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Fig. 8: Pnz versus the k-th nearest/best legitimate receiver for $ = 0
dB, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, Na = 2, Nb = 1, Ne = 2, αk = αe =
µk = 2, µe = 3, and d = 3.
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Fig. 9: The maximum size of the best ordered user k∗ versus $
for selected values of τ and density ratios λb/λe, according to (23),
when Na = Nb = Ne = 1, αk = 3, µk = 2, αk = 2, µk = 3, and
d = υ = 2.
it can be easily seen that many more best users are permitted
for higher $ and higher λb/λe.
As observed in Fig. 7, the 1st nearest/best legitimate receiver
is mostly endangered by the malicious eavesdropper. As a
result, in the following three Figs, the impacts of $, the
receiving antenna numbers Nb, Ne, and the density of two
kinds of receivers, λb and λe on the PNZ are investigated. In
this case, the first nearest/best legitimate receiver is considered
in Figs. 10-12.
In Fig. 10, the PNZs are anticipated to witness an increasing
trend as $ increases. It is intuitively observed that the 1st best
user is guaranteed with a higher probability in the presence
of the 1st nearest eavesdropper. Such a phenomenon repeats
itself for the Figs 11 and 12.
To terminate the discussion, in Figs. 11 and 12, we present
the PNZs against the number of receiving antennas and the
densities, respectively. It is observed that an increased Nb/Ne
ratio indicates the legitimate receivers are much more capable
9-10 -5 0 5 10
10-1
100
Fig. 10: Pnz versus $ for the 1st nearest/best legitimate receiver
for λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, Na = Nb = Ne = 2, αk = αe = 2,
µk = 2, µe = 3, d = 3 and υ = 2.
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Fig. 11: Pnz versus the number of received antennas at the 1st
nearest/best receivers for $ = 10 dB, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, αk =
αe = 2, µk = 1, µe = 3, d = 3, Na = 2 and υ = 2.
to achieve a higher quality of receiving signals, which naturally
yields a higher probability of positive secrecy capacity. It is
validated by Fig. 11(a).
On the contrary, this trend is conversely preserved regardless
of the k-th user index value. As Ne/Nb increases, the k-th best
legitimate receiver achieves the highest and second-highest
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (best performance),
in the presence of the nearest/best eavesdropper, respectively,
which are characterized by Pnz,BN and Pnz,BB . Next, the
1st nearest legitimate receiver suffers more, resulting in a
lower probability, as denoted by Pnz,NN . Naturally, the worst
performance is recoded when the system challenges against
the best eavesdropper, described by Pnz,NB .
From the comparison of the PNZ against densities shown
in Fig. 12, one can conclude that (i) conditioned on a
given λb, the higher λe indicates a system with relatively
more eavesdroppers. An increase in the number of colluding
eavesdroppers progressively endangers the legitimate link,
i.e., probability becomes worse (lower) for higher number of
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Fig. 12: Pnz versus the density of 1st nearest/best receivers for
$ = 10 dB, Na = Nb = Ne = 2, αk = αe = 2, µk = 2, µe = 3,
d = 3 and υ = 2.
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Fig. 13: C¯s versus the k-th nearest/best legitimate receiver for λb =
λe = 1, Na = Nb = Ne = 1, αk = αe = 2, µk = µe = 1, d = 2
and υ = 2, ηk = 15 dB, ηe = 0 dB.
eavesdroppers; (ii) for a fixed number of eavesdroppers, lower
λb values result in worse performance, i.e., lower probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity.
C. Results pertaining to ergodic secrecy capacity
Fig. 13 plots the ergodic secrecy capacity versus the k-th
nearest or best legitimate receiver, while in the presence of the
1st nearest or best eavesdropper, respectively. Again, the same
conclusion can be obtained: the ergodic secrecy capacity, as
depicted in case 4, outperforms the other 3 cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the context of this paper, we investigated the secrecy
performance of HPPP-based random MIMO wireless networks
over α-µ fading channels for the first time. For the purpose
of evaluating the secrecy performance of such a network, the
COP, PNZ and ergodic secrecy capacity for the k-th near-
est/best legitimate receiver in the presence of non-colluding
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eavesdroppers are derived and quantified with closed-form
expressions. The accuracy of our analytical derivations are
further successfully confirmed by simulation outcomes. Re-
markable observations are drawn from the numerical results
obtained in this paper.
Indeed, the secrecy performance metrics are influenced by
the density of users, the path-loss exponent, the number of
transmitting and receiving antennas, as well as the fading
parameters. In addition, the secrecy performance regarding
the k-th best legitimate receiver outperforms that of the k-
th nearest one. Hence, the nearest path does not necessarily
provide the best secrecy performance. This paper’s results and
outcomes regarding parameters that influence secrecy perfor-
mance will enable researchers or wireless system designers
to quickly evaluate system performance and determine the
optimal available parameter choices when facing different
security risks. Finally, inspired from [51], future works will
focus on using the beamforming deploying artificial noise
technique over the homogeneous stochastic MIMO wireless
network.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF f gk
rυ
k
(z)
Setting Z = gkrυk , the PDF of Z can be assessed by the ratio
of gk and rυk , given by the following form
f gk
rυ
k
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
yfgk(yz)frυk (y)dy
(b)
=
δAkkk
Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ exp(−Akyδ)
×H1,00,1
[
θkzy
∣∣∣∣ −(µk − 2αk , 2αk )
]
dy,
(28)
where frυk (y) = exp(−Akyδ)
δ(Aky
δ)k
yΓ(k) , Ak = piλb [23, eq.
(5)], (b) is developed by substituting (2).
Since the exponential function can be expressed in terms of
Fox’s H-function [20, eq. (17)], given as
exp(−Akyδ) = 1
δ
H1,00,1
[
A
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣ −(0, 1δ )
]
, (29)
subsequently, substituting (29) into (28) and using the Mellin
transform of the product of two Fox’s H-function [52, eq.
(2.25.1.1)], the proof is eventually concluded.
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF F gk
rυ
k
(z)
Essentially, F gk
rυ
k
(z) can be mathematically expressed as
F gk
rυ
k
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
Fgk(yz)frυk (y)dy
= 1− δkA
k
k
θkΓ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ−1 exp(−Akyδ)
×H2,01,2
[
A
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣ (1, 1)(0, 1), (µk, 2αk )
]
dy,
(30)
by using (29) and with the aid of [52, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof
is finally achieved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The intensity function of Ψ = {rυk} can be derived from
E{Ψ[0, x)} = λbcdxδ by utilizing the mapping theorem [17,
Corollary 2.a], i.e., λΨ = λbcdδxδ−1.
The intensity of Ξk is obtained by applying the displacement
theorem [53] as follows
λΞk =
∫ ∞
0
λΨρ(x, y)dx =
∫ ∞
0
λΨ
x
y2
fgk(x/y)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
λbcdδ
xδ
y2
fgk(x/y)dx
(c)
= λbcdδy
δ−1
∫ ∞
0
zδfgk(z)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
U4
,
(31)
where (c) is obtained by changing the variable z = x/y. The
integral in (31) is then solved as
U4 =
∫ ∞
0
αkz
αkµk
2 +δ−1
2Ω
αkµk
2
k Γ (µk)
exp
(
−
(
z
Ωk
)αk
2
)
dz
(d)
=
Γ(µk +
2δ
αk
)Ωδk
Γ(µk)
,
(32)
where (d) holds by using [42, eq. (3.381.10)]. The proof is
eventually concluded by substituting (32) into (31).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
By using [24, Lemma 2], we have
Fξk(x) = Pr(ξk < x) = 1− Pr(Ξ[0, x] < k)
= 1−
k−1∑
n=0
exp
(
−
∫ x
0
λΞk(y)dy
) (∫ x
0
λΞk(y)dy
)
n!
= 1−
k−1∑
n=0
exp(−Ab1xδ) (Ab1x
δ)n
n!
=
γ
(
k,Ab1x
δ
)
Γ(k)
.
(33)
When taking the derivative of (33), all terms in the sum are
canceled out but the one for n− 1. The PDF of ξk becomes
fξk(x) = exp
(−Ab1xδ) δ(Ab1xδ)k
xΓ(k)
. (34)
Therefore, the composite channel gain for the k-th best user
can be termed as
F 1
ξk
= Pr
(
1
ξk
< z
)
= 1− Fξk
(
1
z
)
= 1− γ
(
k,Ab1z
−δ)
Γ(k)
=
Γ
(
k,Ab1z
−δ)
Γ(k)
.
(35)
Herein, the last step is derived from [42, eq. (8.356.3)]. By
taking the derivative of F 1
ξk
(z) in terms of z, the PDF of 1ξk
is directly obtained.
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APPENDIX E
DERIVATION OF Pnz,NN IN (19)
Inspired by Lemma 1, Pnz,NN can be essentially derived
as follows
Pnz,NN =
∫ ∞
0
F ge
rυe
($y)f gk
rυ
k
(y) dy
= 1− ke
θeA
1
δ
k Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
H1,11,1
[
θk
A
1
δ
k
y
∣∣∣∣ (1− k − 1δ , 1δ )(µk − 2αk , 2αk )
]
×H2,12,2
[
θe
A
1
δ
e
$y
∣∣∣∣ (0, 1δ ), (1, 1)(0, 1), (µe, 2αe )
]
,
(36)
with the help of [52, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof is accomplished.
APPENDIX F
DERIVATION OF Pnz,NB IN (24)
Thanks to the CDF of gkrυk and PDF of ξe, respectively given
in (4b) and (34), the expression Pnz,NB can be easily stated
as
Pnz,NB = 1−
∫ ∞
0
F gk
rυ
k
(
1
$y
)
fξe(y)dy
=
2δAe1
αkΓ(µk)Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
yδ−1 exp(−Ae1yδ)
×H2,12,2
[
$k
$A
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣ (1− k, 1δ ), (1, 1)(0, 1), (µk, 2αk )
]
dy.
(37)
By using (29) and with the assistance of the property of Fox’s
H-function [52, eq. (8.3.2.7)],
H2,12,2
[
$k
$A
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣ (1− k, 1δ ), (1, 1)(0, 1), (µk, 2αk )
]
= H1,22,2
[
$A
1
δ
k y
$k
∣∣∣∣ (1, 1), (1− µk, 2αk )(k, 1δ ), (0, 1)
]
.
(38)
Pnz,NB can be further developed as
Pnz,NB = 2Ae1
αkΓ(µk)Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
yδ−1H1,00,1
[
A
1
δ
e1y
∣∣∣∣ −(0, 1δ )
]
×H1,22,2
[
$ΩkA
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣ (1− k, 1δ ), (1, 2αk )(µk, 2αk ), (0, 2αk )
]
dy,
(39)
afterwards, performing the Mellin transform of the product
of two Fox’s H-functions [52, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof is
eventually obtained.
APPENDIX G
DERIVATION OF Pnz,BN IN (25)
The Pnz,BN in (18) can be tracked from the PDF of ξk and
the CDF of gerυe , Pnz,4 is thus given by
Pnz,BN =
∫ ∞
0
F ge
rυe
(
$
y
)
fξk(y)dy
= 1− eδA
1
δ
b1
θeΓ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ−1 exp(−Ab1yδ)
×H2,12,2
[
θe$
A
1
δ
e y
∣∣∣∣ (0, 1δ ), (1, 1)(0, 1), (µe, 2αe )
]
dy.
(40)
Subsequently, following the similar steps as (37-39), the proof
is easily proved.
APPENDIX H
DERIVATION OF PROPOSITION (7)
As the very beginning, the logarithm function and expo-
nential function can be alternatively rewritten in terms of the
Fox’s H-function [43, eq. (1.7.2)] and [52, eq. (8.4.6.5)]
log2(1 + x) =
1
ln 2
H1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
, (41)
exp(−x) = H1,00,1
[
x
∣∣∣∣ −(0, 1)
]
. (42)
RMN,k = E gk
rυ
k
[
log2
(
1 +
ηkgk
rυk
)]
=
k
A
1
δ
k Γ(k) ln 2
∫ ∞
0
H1,22,2
[
ηky
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
×H1,11,1
[
θky
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣ (1− k − 1δ , 1δ )(µk − 2αk , 2αk )
]
dy.
(43)
Next, applying the Mellin transform of the product of two
Fox’s H-function [52, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof is accom-
plished.
Using [43, eq. (1.2.4)], the PDF of ξk in (34) can be re-
expressed in terms of Fox’s H-function,
fξk(x) =
δ
xΓ(k)
H1,00,1
[
Ab1x
δ
∣∣∣∣ −(k, 1)
]
, (44)
subsequently, using [43, eq. (1.2.2)] of log2(1 +
1
x ) and
plugging (44), yields
RMB,k = Eξk
[
log2
(
1 +
ηk
ξk
)]
=
δ
Γ(k) ln 2
∫ ∞
0
y−1H1,22,2
[
y
ηk
∣∣∣∣(1, 1), (1, 1)(1, 1), (0, 1)
]
×H1,00,1
[
Ab1y
δ
∣∣∣∣ −(k, 1)
]
dy,
(45)
next, using [52, eq. (2.25.1.1)] and [43, eq. (1.7.1)], the proof
is achieved.
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